发布开云手机在线登陆入口-开云(中国)：2015-08-04
报告题目：The effect of list price in a revenue sharing contract
主讲人：Xiang Fang (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee)
报告开云手机在线登陆入口-开云(中国)：2015年8月5日下午2:00
报告地点：第25教学楼A座3层Class-C
报告人简介：
Dr. Xiang Fang received her B.Eng. and M.Eng. in Systems Engineering from Xiamen University, and Ph.D. in Operations Management from Case Western Reserve University, USA. She is now an associate professor at Sheldon B. Lubar School of Business in University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Dr. Fang's areas of expertise include supply chain management, production and inventory management, stochastic models, applied game theory, and operations-marketing interfaces. Dr. Fang is a member of the Institute of Operations Research and Management Sciences. Her work has appeared in journals including Management Science, Production and Operations Management, Naval Research Logistics,European Journal of Operational Research, etc.
报告摘要：
Electronic commerce such as online retailing has created an unprecedented market place and unconventional distribution channels for suppliers and retailers. Leading the industry, Amazon.com is credited for creating innovative and efficient contracts for managing its operations and business relationship with suppliers. The newest contract offered by Amazon.com is its so-called Advantage Program. A key parameter in the contract is the product list price that Amazon.com allows a supplier to choose. Amazon.com then sets the retail price at or below supplier’s list price for selling the product to the market, and remits the supplier an amount equal to a pre-specified percentage of the list price on each unit sold. We build a game theoretic model to show that supplier’s list price acting as a constraint on retailer’s retail price in the contract plays a major role in determining firms’ decision and performance in equilibrium. In particular, by committing its retail price not to exceed supplier’s list price, the retailer can improve its own profitability without hurting the supplier.
